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Certiﬁ cation’s limited contribution to 
sustainable aquaculture should complement 
public and private governance.
 A
quaculture, the farming of aquatic 
organisms, provides close to 50% 
of the world’s supply of seafood, 
with a value of U.S. $125 billion. It makes 
up 13% of the world’s animal-source protein 
(excluding eggs and dairy) and employs an 
estimated 24 million people ( 1). With cap-
ture (i.e., wild) ﬁ sheries production stagnat-
ing, aquaculture may help close the forecast 
global deﬁ cit in ﬁ sh protein by 2020 ( 2). 
This so-called “blue revolution” requires 
addressing a range of environmental and 
social problems, including water pollution, 
degradation of ecosystems, and violation of 
labor standards.
One response to these problems has been 
the rise of sustainability certiﬁ cation. Reﬂ ect-
ing on the launch of the Aquaculture Steward-
ship Council (ASC) to oversee sustainability 
standards, we argue that, although certifi-
cation makes a contribution, it also has sig-
niﬁ cant limits and should be considered one 
approach among many for steering aquacul-
ture toward sustainable production.
Sustainability certiﬁ cation is a market-
based system involving (i) setting standards 
for ecological and social interactions, (ii) 
auditing compliance with these standards, 
(iii) attaching labels to products and enter-
prises that meet the standards, and (iv) cre-
ating institutions to perform these functions 
( 3). Although these can be carried out by 
public bodies, certiﬁ cation systems largely 
run by private organizations, such as ﬁ rms 
and/or nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), are gaining prominence.
Certif ication has emerged in sectors 
where governance has shifted away from 
state regulation. Activists frustrated with 
slow and inadequate government responses 
to environmental threats and private sector 
actors seeking to avoid increased produc-
tion costs and damage to their reputations 
have contributed to the rise of certiﬁ cation 
( 4,  5). The goals of certification include 
increasing consumer trust, providing legiti-
macy to producers, and reducing liability by 
ensuring compliance with safety and qual-
ity standards ( 4). These goals also motivate 
seafood sustainability certiﬁ cation, includ-
ing both aquaculture and capture fisher-
ies, which has expanded in recent years to 
include more than 30 standards and infor-
mation schemes ( 6).
Markets for Sustainability Certiﬁ cation
The greatest demand for certiﬁ ed aquacul-
ture products comes from North America 
and Europe, where large supermarket and 
restaurant chains have committed to selling 
only certiﬁ ed sustainable seafood by 2015 
( 7). Global and regional buyers are turn-
ing to certiﬁ ed seafood in response to NGO 
campaigns that threaten their brands by 
associating them with “bad” environmental 
and labor practices.
Only a small proportion of world aqua-
culture production (4.6%) is currently cer-
tiﬁ ed (see the chart) . The approach to date, 
now exempliﬁ ed by the ASC, has been to 
develop “species-specific” standards for 
each of the 13 species groups with the high-
est demand in global export markets. These 
account for 41.6% of worldwide aquacul-
ture production by weight, which leaves 
58.4% not covered and, therefore, “non-
certifiable” (see the chart). Recent intro-
duction of generic multispecies standards 
(that apply across more than one species 
group) by two ASC competitors, the Aqua-
culture Certiﬁ cation Council (ACC) and the 
Good Agricultural Practices organization 
GLOBALG.A.P., has expanded the poten-
tially certiﬁ able volume of global produc-
tion to 73.5% (see the chart). Despite cov-
ering nearly twice as much production, the 
multispecies standards represent an increase 
of only 0.1% in likely demand over the spe-
cies-specific standards, because much of 
what is potentially certiﬁ able is produced 
and sold in countries (notably China) with 
little demand for sustainability certiﬁ cation 
( 8) [see supplementary materials (SM)]. 
Certiﬁ cation schemes cover a range of 
criteria from organic to responsible to sus-
tainable aquaculture, representing demand 
for different product qualities. Schemes 
compete for suppliers, which must comply 
with one or more standards to access spe-
ciﬁ c (northern) markets. They compete for 
buyers by attempting to convince retailers 
and branded agro-food processors to dis-
tribute aquaculture products carrying their 
label. They compete for approval from—and 
form alliances with—inﬂ uential NGOs.
Producers have to make strategic deci-
sions about which standards to adopt and, 
thus, which processors to use and interna-
tional markets to access. These choices also 
inﬂ uence the support that local governments, 
NGOs, and donors offer (e.g., by underwrit-
ing on-farm improvements or management 
of common resources, such as water).
Narrow Take on Sustainability
The unit of certiﬁ cation largely determines 
what is included in and excluded from def-
initions of sustainability. Fisheries and for-
estry certification schemes take zonal or 
sectoral approaches and involve resource 
managers (e.g., boards and government 
departments). Certiﬁ cation in aquaculture, 
as in organic agriculture, takes an enter-
prise-level approach. Because private pro-
duction units (farms or value chains) are 
certiﬁ ed, the cumulative impacts of multi-
ple farms in a particular location ( 9) or the 
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impact of aquaculture on surrounding agri-
culture or mangrove conservation is rarely 
effectively considered ( 10). Farm-level cer-
tiﬁ cation systems, such as ASC, pay some 
attention to effects from inputs, such as seed 
and feed, but do not include those resulting 
from processing [e.g., ( 11)]. The impact 
of nonmarine feed inputs, such as soy and 
wheat, is not considered. None of the main 
aquaculture certiﬁ cation schemes consider 
environmental costs of distribution and 
transportation.
These narrow deﬁ nitions of sustainabil-
ity reﬂ ect the structure of standard-setting 
institutions and the feasibility of measure-
ment and regulation using technical param-
eters. Even multistakeholder processes used 
to develop ASC standards, including pub-
lic input through forums and online review, 
have been criticized for adopting a techni-
cal focus that reﬂ ects interests and values 
of the most powerful actors to the exclusion 
of others ( 9). Many stakeholders, especially 
producers in the Global South, are unable to 
participate for reasons of language, access, 
cost, time, or resources; others disagree with 
the whole approach. Even when such stake-
holders participate, they are often unable to 
meaningfully inﬂ uence outcomes ( 9).
This suggests that certiﬁ cation is substan-
tially a strategy for buyers to avoid adverse 
publicity by outsourcing reputational risk, 
whereas costs are imposed on suppliers. The 
leverage of powerful actors, including envi-
ronmental activists and northern buyers, in 
deﬁ ning standards for aquaculture has left 
little room for local understandings of agro-
ecology and social dimensions of equity and 
justice ( 12).
Although the ASC has incorporated 
social standards, the codiﬁ cation of com-
plex, context-dependent social issues, espe-
cially those beyond the farm, remains prob-
lematic. Working conditions and worker 
rights are a key issue with shrimp and salmon 
produced in the Global South. Certiﬁ cation 
may produce enclaves with improved work-
ing conditions and may raise the proﬁ le of 
labor issues with state regulatory agencies. 
But certiﬁ cation alone cannot improve poor 
working conditions in the broader aquacul-
ture sector.
Inclusion and Exclusion
Certiﬁ cation is complex and expensive and 
assumes a level of managerial capability that 
most aquaculture producers in the Global 
South do not have. Without external support 
(e.g., from a collective or co-op, donor-funded 
project, processor or buyer, government, 
or NGO), smallholders are often excluded 
from markets that require certiﬁ cation. Com-
pliance is easier for larger-scale, better-
capitalized production units that can deal with 
record-keeping and administrative require-
ments; certiﬁ cation tends to strengthen trends 
toward consolidation in export-oriented sec-
tors ( 13). Not only producers are excluded, 
but also up- and downstream supply chain 
actors, e.g., collectors, small-scale traders, 
brokers, and input suppliers.
Variants of certiﬁ cation systems (such as 
group certiﬁ cation) that cater to problems of 
smallholders can mitigate these exclusions. 
However, although niche schemes (e.g., 
organic and fair trade) confer premiums that 
can protect smaller enterprises, schemes 
that target mainstream northern markets, 
such as the ASC, do not. A failure to tailor 
certiﬁ cation to smallholder needs usually 
results in their exclusion from these markets 
( 14). Smallholders already forced to com-
ply with advanced national food safety and 
traceability systems [e.g., those in Thailand, 
see ( 15)] are better positioned to meet strin-
gent organic or sustainability certiﬁ cation 
requirements than those in countries where 
state enforcement is weaker.
The addition of carp to new multispecies 
standards appears to mark an expansion of 
coverage but highlights a point of exclusion. 
Because of differing cuisines and the con-
sumption of a relatively small range of spe-
cies in northern markets (carp is predomi-
nantly grown and consumed in the Global 
South), widespread certiﬁ cation of carp is 
unlikely. Even if carp is certiﬁ ed, consumer 
interest in emerging middle-class markets 
focuses on food safety, and sustainability or 
social qualities remain niche concerns ( 8). 
Nevertheless, emergence of domestic stan-
dards demonstrates that concern over sus-
tainability may increase; certiﬁ ers should 
explore complementarities given projected 
future dominance of these markets.
Beyond Limits to Certiﬁ cation
Comparative advantages and potential syn-
ergies of certiﬁ cation should be explored 
vis-à-vis a mix of other private governance 
strategies (e.g., ethical supply chain man-
agement) and state regulation. Although pri-
vate sustainability certiﬁ cation was born in 
part out of fear of underregulation by states, 
it is now blamed for being inﬂ exible, divi-
sive, and restrictive ( 5). The assumption that 
countries in the Global South are incapable 
of regulating aquaculture no longer holds 
true everywhere. Countries that have dealt 
with mandatory international food-safety 
requirements demonstrate a capacity to bet-
ter govern sustainability and represent some 
of the most important domestic markets in 
the Global South for aquaculture products.
Northern-led certiﬁ cation need no longer 
be imposed in lieu of state regulation or in 
isolation from local standards development 
but should be institutionalized as part of a 
broader array of approaches, including state 
and private regulation in the Global South. 
Successful certiﬁ cation schemes often build 
on what the state has already done, through 
food safety, traceability, or state-led vol-
untary better-management practices ( 12, 
 16). The question remains as to whether 
improved public and private engagement in 
the South would result in less exclusionary 
outcomes for producers. But as limitations 
of international sustainability certiﬁ cation 
become apparent, there is a need to explore 
new hybrid forms of environmental gover-
nance that draw on the strengths of states, the 
private sector, and institutions such as ASC. 
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